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Dirk Geeraerts has played a key role in launching Cognitive Linguistics as a full-fledged theory of 
linguistics and in expanding its sphere of influence in Western Europe. Dirk is furthermore one of the 
first and strongest advocates for the incorporation of empirical methods - and quantitative, corpus-
based methods in particular - into cognitive linguistic research. The “Quantitative Turn” (Janda 2013) is 
in large part due to his relentless insistence on methodological rigour. In this chapter, I want to take a 
closer look at what is currently methodological “good practice” in the field and draw attention to some 
of the assumptions that underlie our methodology and thereby shape our findings yet have gone 
unquestioned. Four challenges are highlighted - data annotation, statistical analysis, model validation 
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After half a century of self-imposed exile from the cognitive scene, cognitive linguists have put language 
back on stage — language is no longer considered a highly specialized and largely autonomous cognitive 
module that needs “special treatment”. Instead, linguistic abilities are seen as rooted in general 
cognitive abilities and meaning is understood as conceptualization. In fact, cognitive linguists are bound 
by two major commitments: the generalization commitment and the cognitive commitment (Lakoff 
1990: 40). All cognitive linguists are committed (or are assumed to be committed) to providing a 
characterization of the general principles governing all aspects of human language in a way that is 
informed by and accords with what is known about the brain and mind from other disciplines. Work in 
the Cognitive Linguistic tradition therefore likes to stress that the analyses proposed are “in line with 
what is known about the mind” and abounds with claims that the proposed analysis would be 
cognitively realistic, if not cognitively real. But is this really so? 
Unlike many other modern theories of linguistics, Cognitive Linguistics also aims to be a usage-
based model of language structure (Langacker 1987: 46). All language units arise from and are shaped by 
usage events by means of the aforementioned general cognitive abilities such as perception, attention, 
memory, categorization and abstraction. Usage events are observable, and therefore they can be 
collected, measured, and analyzed (Glynn 2010: 5–6). A decade ago, Tummers et al. (2005: 225-226) 
concluded that “[c]orpus linguistics would be an obvious methodology for a usage-based linguistics: you 
cannot have a usage-based linguistics unless you study actual usage - as it appears in an online and 
elicited form in experimental settings or as it appears in its most natural form in corpora in the shape of 
spontaneous, non-elicited language data”. While in 2005 “the use of corpus materials [was] not yet the 
dominant approach, and to the extent that the research is actually corpus-based, a tendency toward the 
use of advanced corpus techniques [was] only beginning to emerge” (Tummers et al. 2005: 248), the 
situation is rather different now. In order to describe a phenomenon and uncover the mechanisms that 
govern it, linguists tend to turn to the linguistic analysis and statistical modeling of data from large 
corpora or elicited through experiments. Anno 2015, there are plenty of published articles that rely on 
data extracted from corpora and annotated for a multitude of morphological, syntactic, semantic and 
pragmatic parameters, to model a phenomenon and/or predict the choice for one morpheme, lexeme 
or construction over another. According to Janda (2013: 4) we can “divide the history of Cognitive 
Linguistics [the journal - D.D.] into two eras, 1990–2007 – when most articles were not quantitative, and 
2008–2012 – when most articles were quantitative” [a “quantitative article” being defined as an article 
in which a researcher reports numbers for some kind of authentic language data]. She continues “[w]e 
can [...] securely identify 2008–2012 as a distinct period in the history of Cognitive Linguistics. During 
this period quantitative analysis emerges as common practice, dominating the pages of our journal” 
(Janda 2013: 6). 
 
Dirk Geeraerts was instrumental in launching Cognitive Linguistics as a full-fledged theory of 
linguistics and has shown particular concern for its methodological machinery. In the next two sections I 
will take a closer look at the usage-based approach of which Dirk has been one of the strongest 
advocates, and I will discuss some of the challenges that this changed paradigm is currently facing. I will 
discuss the following  challenges in turn: 
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Challenge 1. We work in a corpus-based fashion, at the heart of which lies the manual 
annotation of data. Do we reflect sufficiently on how our very first decisions affect our findings?  
Challenge 2. We analyze our data statistically, using approaches from the frequentist tradition. 
Do we give enough consideration to the assumptions on which these techniques are based and 
to the implications that has for our findings?  
Challenge 3. We capture human behavior in models, knowing that “all models are wrong” (Box 
1976: 792). Are we sufficiently concerned about testing our models against human behavior?  
Challenge 4. We run experiments on language, complying with methodological requirements 
developed for other aspects of human behavior. Should we not pause to consider whether the 
nature of language meshes with the standard designs? 
 
In other words, I want to draw attention to assumptions that underlie our choice of methods and hence 
shape our findings, yet have hitherto gone unquestioned.  
 
Challenge 1: data annotation categories and principles vary widely  
 
An important contribution to the statistical analysis of linguistic data -- of any data, really -- is made by 
the variables used to capture the phenomenon. At the heart of a corpus-based study of linguistic 
phenomena lies the (often manual) annotation of examples. These data annotations are typically 
“linguistic” in nature, that is, they are based on categories that were designed to aid the description of a 
language’s form and meaning. Some of these categories have been around for millennia; the 
classification of words into categories, for example, predates Christianity. As early as the 5th century BC, 
Sanskrit grammarians grouped words into classes – that would later become known as parts of speech – 
distinguishing between inflected nouns and verbs and uninflected pre-verbs and particles. Other 
linguistic categories that are well established in theoretical linguistics, regardless of framework, are, for 
example, phonemes, morphemes, tense, mood, aspect etc. Cognitive Linguistics has created its own 
categories, such as image schemas, trajectors and landmarks, conceptual metaphors, constructions and 
frames. With few exceptions the universality of the adopted traditional linguistic categories has gone 
unquestioned (e.g. Evans & Levinson 2009) and the cognitive reality of the newly introduced cognitive 
linguistic categories has not been systematically addressed (cf. Gibbs & Colston 1995).  
Linguistic reality and psychological reality seem to have become one, resulting in a situation 
whereby linguists elevate linguistic descriptions to psychological explanations and psycholinguists 
expect to find evidence of the cognitive reality of classifications that were designed to aid the 
description of language data, not to reflect the workings of the mind (compare also Eddington 2002: 
212-213). Yet “[c]ognitively real generalizations may not at all accord with generalizations arrived at by 
classical techniques of linguistic analysis” (Lakoff 1990: 41). In fact, there is no agreed-upon definition of 
what is meant by “cognitively real(istic)” and what level of cognitive commitment is expected. 
Categories that are “consistent with our overall knowledge about cognition and the brain” (Lakoff 1990: 
45) could well range from categories that can be presented as radial categories with prototype structure 
to those for which there is neurological evidence, i.e. a unique neurological signature that proves that a 
category is treated as a processing unit in its own right by actual language users. 
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A second question that would benefit from more consideration relates to the nature and extent 
of our data annotation: a typical analysis involves coding a large number of extractions for a number of 
properties, yet studies diverge in their implementation of this principle. The vast majority of studies 
annotate their data for a limited number of properties that operationalize a specific hypothesis. Some 
more recent studies, however, explicitly advocate the annotation of as many potentially relevant 
properties as possible in as linguistically naive a way as possible (Arppe 2008, Divjak 2010). While the 
former approach seems suited if we aim to pitch competing linguistic hypotheses against each other, 
the latter approach is more appropriate if we are interested in letting the relevant patterns fall out from 
the data (but see Challenge 2). In fact, Cognitive Linguistics has been “accused” of using “categories 
gained from introspection rather than from the data itself” (Teubert 2005: 2). Syntactic, semantic and 
discourse-related higher-level abstract features are believed to help reveal more general patterns 
(Theijssen et al. 2013: 228) but recent research has shown that including these features - that are often 
difficult to define and to annotate with high agreement levels between human annotators - does not 
necessarily yield a better model than working with lexical features, such as the actual words used 
(Theijssen et al. 2013: 246, 257). An approach that stays close to the raw data and captures “every 
possible clue” comes with the added benefit that “[k]eeping as much detail[ed] information as long as 
possible — even throughout advanced stages of analysis — is crucial because we never know if what we 
believe to be the relevant features really are the only essential ones” (Wälchli & Cysouw 2012:703).  
 
Challenge 2: “probabilistic” is a polysemous word 
   
Usage constitutes the dataset in which general patterns can be detected, and this is more and more 
frequently done by making use of statistical techniques. Reliance on data and statistics certainly gives us 
more confidence in our conclusions, but does it guarantee that our models are any cognitively more 
real(istic) than they were before? We do not seem to worry very much about detecting patterns in a 
cognitively realistic fashion. Much of modern statistics was developed on the basis of the frequentist 
(rather than Bayesian) interpretation of probability and we readily adopt frequentist techniques to 
model our data. For those models to be cognitively real(istic), we would need to assume that 
probabilistic reasoning underlies language knowledge and use. But, “probabilistic” is a polysemous word 
and in linguistic circles, the non-technical meaning of “supported by evidence strong enough to establish 
presumption but not proof” appears to prevail. Probabilistic grammars are seen as opposed to rule-
based grammars and this reflects the insight that the phenomenon studied is not fully predictable. As 
Kilgariff (2005) and many others have observed: language is never ever random; however, it is also 
rarely, if ever, fully predictable.  
This “linguistic” interpretation of the statistical term “probabilistic” is rather different from the 
frequentist statistical interpretation as “the ratio of the number of outcomes in an exhaustive set of 
equally likely outcomes that produce a given event to the total number of possible outcomes” or “the 
chance that a given event will occur”. According to frequentists, the probability of an event is defined as 
the relative frequency of the event in some reference class (Lassiter 2012). The reference class is a core 
component in the probability calculation and one that is highly problematic: it makes the probability of 
an event dependent on the choice of a reference class, and because an event belongs to many reference 
classes, it is not always obvious which reference class to choose (cf. the cell 4 problem reported for 
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collostructional analysis in Schmid & Küchenhoffer 2013). Moreover, the interpretation of probability as 
relative frequency cannot make intuitive sense of the fact that probabilities can attach to non-
repeatable events (Lassiter 2012): according to the frequentist definition, the probability of an event 
that can only happen once is either 1 (if it happens) or 0 (if it does not happen). A variant of frequentism 
(von Mises 1957) therefore claims that the probability of an event should be identified with the relative 
frequency in a hypothetical sequence generated by flipping the coin an infinite number of times.  
A more palatable approach to uncertainty is found in Bayesianism, which remains rare in 
linguistics, however. For Bayesians, probability is weight of evidence: it is a measure of a rational agent’s 
degree of belief in a proposition (Lassiter 2012). Bayesian methods apply in a wider range of situations 
than frequentist methods, and are more flexible. Crucially, Bayesian methods can be applied to 
estimating probabilities for repeatable and non-repeatable events and it is possible to incorporate prior 
information into a model (Lassiter 2012). This seems crucial for modeling cognitive phenomena such as 
language, since human beings usually approach inference problems with some prior knowledge. 
However, research from decision making has shown that people have extreme difficulty if information is 
given and answers are asked for in single-event probabilities; but they appear to behave like good 
“intuitive statisticians” when information is given and answers are asked for in frequencies (Brase et al. 
1998: 19).  
 
Challenge 3: models are rarely tested on speakers 
 
The number of publications relying on empirical data collections and statistical data modelling has 
increased spectacularly. The most advanced analyses rely on regression analyses to model which of the 
candidate properties are predictive of the form which is the focus of the study. These techniques are 
attractive because they allow to (1) estimate the relative weights of the linguistic explanatory variables 
in natural terms as odds, and to (2) model the impact of the co-occurrence of these variables in various 
combinations as expected probability distributions for the alternative lexemes/constructions. Yet 
neither frequentist nor Bayesian models are based on learning mechanisms.  
If we want our linguistics to be cognitively realistic, should we not consider using modeling 
techniques that are directly based on principles of human learning? Several models of learning have 
been implemented for and tested on language data, and the predictions have been compared to the 
behavior of subjects in experimental settings. The best-known ones in Cognitive Linguistic circles are 
Connectionist Modelling (Rumelhart & McClelland 1986), Analogical Modelling (Skousen 1989), 
Memory-based Learning (Daelemans & van den Bosch 2005) and more recently Naive Discriminative 
Learning (Baayen 2010). Eddington (2000) compared a connectionist model with an analogical model 
and a memory-based model in their performance on the English past tense. His findings showed that, 
different from the connectionist model that only handled the irregular items well, the analogical and 
memory-based models successfully predicted subject’s choice of past tense for nonce verbs for both 
regular and irregular items, and they did so by comparing the nonce words to words in the database in 
terms of their phonological similarity. Theijssen et al (2013) compared the performance of logistic 
regression (using higher-level features), Bayesian networks (using higher-level features) and Memory-
based learning (using lexical items) in predicting the English dative alternation. They found the overall 
performance of the three models to be virtually identical, although the classification of the individual 
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cases by the memory-based model differed most from the other two approaches. Baayen et al. (2013) 
have shown that statistical classifiers based on cognitively realistic approximations of how humans learn 
such as NDL perform as well as regression models for binary choices. Preliminary results support this 
finding for more complex corpus models that predict a 4-way polytomous choice (Arppe & Baayen 
2011).  
 
Another important challenge faced by linguists is the question of how to evaluate such models. 
The most rigorous studies fit a statistical model to one part of the data (the training set) and test it on a 
new set of corpus examples (the testing set) to see how well the findings generalize to new data. But is a 
corpus-based model with high predictive power satisfactory even if the model’s performance is not 
tested against speakers’ performance? If interest is in modelling human knowledge, should we not 
compare our models' performance to that of native speakers of the language? Surprisingly few papers 
currently attempt this (for an overview, see Klavan & Divjak, under review) and linguists who run an 
experimental study after a corpus-based study often refer to this process as “validation”. This, 
unfortunately, creates the impression that behavioral experimental data is inherently more valuable 
than textual data, be it transcribed spoken language or originally written language. But for language, 
textual data is the result of one of the most natural types of linguistic behavior: “[a] corpus is a 
collection of non-elicited usage events. It constitutes a sample of spontaneous language use that is 
(generally) realized by native speakers” (Tummers et al. 2005: 231). Observing the output qualifies as an 
“observational study” and possibly as a “natural experiment”; these types of experiments are quite 
popular in disciplines where experimental manipulation of groups and treatments would be unethical, 
e.g. epidemiology. Through observation we get a real picture of the phenomenon as it manifests in 
natural settings, although we should not forget that corpus data is not actually representative of any 
single speaker; instead, it represents a non-existing average speaker (cf. Blumenthal-Dramé 2012: 30, 
34).  
 
Challenge 4: language in the lab versus language in use 
 
Experiments, and laboratory-based experiments in particular, afford the researcher a high level of 
control over variables; by manipulating the variables, it becomes possible to establish cause and effect 
relationships. Due to the need to maintain control over the variables experimental studies are often run 
in artificial settings. It is maintained that the physical situations in the real world and in the lab may 
differ, provided that the same processes are occurring. And this is where the shoe pinches: experimental 
linguistic studies standardly present words in isolation or use artificially constructed stimuli that bear 
little resemblance to naturally produced data. There are at least two reasons to suspect that the 
customary approach to stimulus selection makes it unlikely that the same processes that regulate 
language use in real life occur in the lab. 
First, when selecting stimuli for an experiment, psycholinguists do not routinely conduct a 
multivariate corpus-based analysis, and often limit their interest in corpora to the possibility to use them 
as source of information on the frequency of occurrence of words or chunks. This is because frequency, 
just like familiarity and length, is known to exert a strong influence on a number of behaviors, including 
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processing speed: to avoid the "confound of frequency" when comparing reaction times to different 
categories of words or other language structures experimental items are routinely matched for 
frequency. Yet extracting only frequency of occurrence information from a corpus severely impoverishes 
the richness of the linguistic experience from which learners extract patterns; there is more to a word 
than its frequency of occurrence. In fact, in a natural setting so many factors influence a given 
phenomenon that any selection, not based on an exhaustive, i.e. multivariate, study of the phenomenon 
is a stab in the dark. Speakers have extremely specific expectations about words that are learned from 
encountering those words in their natural contexts. It has been shown that probabilities are essential for 
a cognitive model of sentence processing (Jurafsky 1996) and Divjak & Arppe (2014) have established 
that this is not only the case when probable combinations are compared to (artificially created) 
improbable combinations but even when all combinations occur naturally, i.e. are more or less likely. 
Context is another confound, yet one that is routinely ignored. Psycholinguists might want to worry less 
about length-based, familiarity-based, or frequency-based lexical effects and more about properties of 
language in use that might affect experimental results. Ignoring the dependence of a word and the 
specific form it occurs in on its context may well skew our understanding of the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying word processing.  
Second, experimental settings may “force participants to tackle problems that are not faced in 
normal discourse” (Deignan 2005: 117). While it is justified to adhere to standard experimental 
methodology in order to identify basic mechanisms such as frequency effects that are of core relevance 
to the theory, it seems questionable to also apply these methods when validating specific predictions. 
The results of the latter type of experiments may well tell us something interesting about the processing 
of X under condition Y, but if condition Y is not typically encountered in reality, they do not tell us much 
about the processing of language in use. Now that corpus-based techniques are available to calculate 
the probability of a word (form) given all other words in the sentence, and advances in analysis 
techniques make it possible to control for a plethora of factors statistically, running experiments with 
words in their natural contexts is achievable. This will, in fact, bring closer the ideal of “controlling 
everything but the variables that are being manipulated” while also ensuring the external validity of the 
findings. The ecological validity of laboratory results has been questioned in more general terms. 
Mitchell (2012) aggregated results of several meta-analyses and concluded that, although many 
psychological results found in the laboratory can be replicated in the field, their effects often differ 
greatly in size and sometimes even in direction (Mitchell 2012: 114). It remains to be seen to what 
extent current experimental linguistic findings are side-effects of the experimental settings used. 
 
 
Where do we go from here? 
 
Paraphrasing Divjak (2012) I conclude that studying language in use is a discipline at the intersection of 
linguistics and psychology. Yet many psycholinguistic studies have been carried out by research teams 
that do not include (corpus) linguists who love getting their hands dirty in the data. Counting readily 
identifiable forms taken out of their natural context significantly diminishes the richness of the input 
from which human beings extract and learn distributional patterns. At the same time, many cognitive 
corpus linguistic studies continue to take their painstakingly annotated textual datasets to be a pretty 
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reliable map of speakers’ minds, forgetting that what is learned or acquired by probabilistic means is not 
strictly proportional to the stimulus (and that frequency of occurrence is not the “be all and end all” in 
language, see Baayen 2010; Ellis 2012). Probabilistic learning theory holds that language learning is 
based on complex, higher-order properties of probabilistic patterns in sensory experience, not a mere 
tabulation of frequency of patterns (Elman 2003). Driven to its extreme, this split approach reduces our 
billion-neuron brains that enable us to adapt quickly to an immense array of stimuli to nothing more 
than sophisticated abacuses used to keep tallies of all the words found in the messy bag that language 
is.  
 
David Poeppel tweeted recently (05.01.2015) “I'm pretty tired of big data and definitely ready for big 
theory. Let's stop collecting so much damn data and use 2015 to think about stuff”. It wouldn’t be a bad 
idea to take a break from collecting and modeling data and indeed spend some time “thinking about 
stuff”, about the methodological questions raised in this chapter, and about their theoretical 
foundations and implications. Twenty five years ago Lakoff (1990: 43, 36) wrote that “I am sure that 
others who consider themselves cognitive linguists do not have the same primary commitments that I 
do, and that disagreements over how to properly analyze a given phenomenon are sure to follow from 
differences in primary commitments. [...] Without agreement on initial premises, arguments about 
conclusions will be pointless”. That is as true today as it was then. Among the questions we need to 
answer are the following: are we, or are we not, concerned with cognitively real generalizations? What 
do we mean by “cognitively real generalizations”? If we take cognitively real generalizations to 
encompass only that for which evidence can be found in the minds of speakers, can we, or can we not, 
arrive at such generalizations given that our data elicitation paradigms do not require that language is 
studied in use; our data annotation schemas hinge on linguistic insights that the average speaker may 
well lack; and our modeling techniques are not implementations of the way in which human beings 
learn? Lakoff (1990: 41) pointed out, “If we are fortunate, these [i.e. generalization and cognitive] 
commitments will mesh: the general principles we seek will be cognitively real. If not, the cognitive 
commitment takes priority: we are concerned with cognitively real generalizations. This is anything but a 
trivial matter”. That, too, is as true today as it was then.   
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